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STATUS AND TRENDS IN STATE PRODUCT
LIABILITY LAW: STATE OF THE ART EVIDENCE
INTRODUCTION
State of the art evidence refers to the pertinent scientific and tech-
nological knowledge existing at the time a product was designed or
manufactured.' Manufacturers often try to introduce such evidence in
product liability actions to show that their product could not have been
designed, manufactured or tested in a safer manner in light of then-
existing knowledge or technology. Several states recently have enacted
statutes that provide guidelines for the admission and use of state of the
art evidence. 2 These statutes share the common purposes of resolving the
confusion and controversy surrounding this evidence and protecting man-
ufacturers from unjust claims.
This section will discuss the rationales for the admissibility of state
of the art evidence. The section will examine how various states treat
state of the art evidence and how such evidence affects standards of
proof. Finally, the section will describe how states have tailored state of
the art evidence to their particular needs and how these modifications
may shape the future of the doctrine.
THE EVOLVING DEFINITION
State of the art evidence has become a source of great confusion in
product litigation. This confusion has developed largely because courts
have used the term "state of the art" to describe several forms of
circumstantial evidence.3 When courts are referring to then-existing knowl-
edge of scientific and technological advances, state of the art evidence
may consist of expert testimony about such knowledge by scientists and
engineers in the relevant field.
4
State of the art has also been defined in terms of industrial customs5
or concepts of practical feasibility. 6 A defendant introducing evidence of
1. See, e.g., Bruce v. Martin-Marreitta Corp., 544 F.2d 442 (10th Cir. 1976); Olson v. Artic
Enterprises, 349 F. Supp. 761 (D.N.D. 1972); Balido v. Improved Mach., Inc., 29 Cal. App.
3d 633, 105 Cal. Rptr. 890 (1973); Wiska v. St. Stanislaus Social Club, Inc., 390 N.E.2d 1138
(Mass. App. 1979).
2. See ARuz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-683 (1984); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 34-2804 (1983); CoLo. REv,. STAT. §
13-21-403(l)(a) (Supp. 1987); IND. CODE ANN. § 33-1-1.5-4(4) (Burns 1983); IowA CODE ANN.
§ 668.12 (Supp. 1986); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3304(a)(b) (1983); Ky. REV. STAT. § 411.310 (2)
(1986); NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-21, 182 (1985); TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-28-104 (1983); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 78-15-6(3) (Supp. 1986); WASH. REV. CODE § 7.72.050 (1)(2) (Supp. 1987).
3. For a discussion of the sources of confusion surrounding the definition of state of the art, see
IA L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, PRODUCT LIABILITY, § 12.0712] (1985).
4. See IA L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, supra note 3, at § 12.0713], 376.7 (1985).
5. See, e.g., Sturm, Ruger & Co. v. Day, 594 P.2d 38 (Alaska 1979); Caterpillar Tractor Co. v.
Beck, 593 P.2d 871 (Alaska 1979); Horn v. General Motors Corp., 17 Cal. 3d 359, 551 P.2d
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customary practices in the industry would try to show that the production
technologies and procedures were consistent with those used by other
manufacturers in the industry. 7 A defendant introducing feasibility evi-
dence would try to show that alternative designs or manufacturing methods
were impractical in light of cost, marketability and mass production
requirements.8 Some courts have defined state of the art in terms of
compliance with governmental and administrative regulations relating to
various aspects of production. 9
The majority of jurisdictions treat the defendant's state of the art
evidence, however defined, as merely one factor to be considered in
assessing liability. The courts in these jurisdictions will admit this evidence
only to show that the manufacturer was not negligent 0 or that the product
was not defective." Although this evidence has been sufficient in some
cases to direct a verdict in the defendant's favor, 12 state of the art evidence
normally does not raise a presumption in the defendant's favor, nor does
it constitute an affirmative defense. Courts normally consider such evi-
dence relevant but not conclusive.
EFFECT ON STANDARDS OF PROOF
State of the art statutes have substantially altered the common law
use of that type of evidence in several states. Most state statutes provide
that evidence of compliance with then-existing state of the art standards
raises an affirmative defense 3 or presumption of nonliability. 4 These
398, 131 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1976); Gelsumino v. E.W. Bliss Co., 10 Ill. App. 3d 604, 295 N.E.2d
110 (1975). But see, Suter v. San Angelo Foundary & Mach. Co., 81 N.J. 150, 406 A.2d 140
(1979); Cantu v. John Deere Co., 24 Wash. App. 701, 603 P.2d 839 (1979).
6. See, e.g., Larsen v. General Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495 (8th Cir. 1968); Scott v. Dries &
Krump Mfg. Co., 26 Il. App. 3d 971, 326 N.E.2d 74 (1975); Roach v. Kononen, 269 Ore. 457,
525 P.2d 125 (1974).
7. For a discussion of proof aspects of state of the art evidence, see O'Donnel, Design Litigation
and the State of Art: Terminology, Practice and Reform, 11 AKRON L. REV. 627, 646-53 (1978).
8. See generally id.
9. See, e.g., Frazier v. Keysor Indus., 607 P.2d 1296 (Colo. App. 1979); Rucker v. Norfolk & W.
Ry., 64 Ill. App. 3d 770, 381 N.E.2d 715 (1978), rev'd on other grounds, 77 I11. 2d 434, 396
N.E.2d 534 (1979).
10. See, e.g., Olson v. Artic Enterprises, 349 F. Supp. 761 (D.N.D. 1972); Larsen v. General Motors
Corp., 391 F.2d 495 (8th Cir. 1968); Horn v. General Motors Corp., 17 Cal. 3d 359, 551 P.2d
398, 131 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1976); Gelsumino v. E.W. Bliss Co., 10 111. App. 3d 604, 295 N.E.2d
110 (1975); Wiska v. St. Stanislaus Social Club, Inc., 390 N.E.2d 1138 (Mass. App. 1979).
11. Many courts admit state of the art evidence to measure the reasonable consumer expectation as
a basis for determining design defectiveness. See, e.g., Bruce v. Martin-Marrietta Corp., 544
F.2d 442 (10th Cir. 1976); Cantu v. John Deere Co., 24 Wash. App. 701, 603 P.2d 839 (1979).
Other courts admit this evidence as part of a risk/utility analysis that serves the same purpose.
See, e.g., Lolie v. Ohio Brass, 502 F.2d 741 (7th Cir. 1974); Voss v. Black & Decker Mfg.,
Co., 59 N.Y.2d 102, 463 N.Y.S.2d 398 (1983). Wilson v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 282 Or. 61, 577
P.2d 1322 (1978); Turner v. General Motors Corp., 584 S.W.2d 844 (Tex. 1979).
12. E.g., Olson v. Artic Enterprises, 349 F. Supp. 761 (D.N.D. 1972); Mondshour v. General
Motors Corp., 298 F. Supp. IIl (D. Md. 1969).
13. See ARIz. REV. STAT. § 12-683 (1984); IND. CODE ANN. § 33-1-1.5-4(4) (Burns 1983); NEB. REV.
STAT. § 25-21, 182 (1985).
14. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-403(l)(a) (Supp. 1987); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3304(a)(b) (1983);
Ky. REv. STAT. § 411.310 (2) (1986); TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-28-104 (1983); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 78-15-6(3) (Supp. 1986).
State of the Art Evidence
statutes go beyond the common law by immunizing a defendant from
liability in those situations where pertinent scientific and technological
knowledge was unavailable at the time of design or manufacture.
In Arizona and Nebraska, a product liability defendant cannot be
held liable for a defective design of a product if it is proved that the
design, planning and manufacturing techniques of the product conformed
to the state of the art at the time of sale. 5 The Arizona statute defines
state of the art as the "technical, mechanical, and scientific knowledge...
which was in existence and reasonably feasible for use at the time of
manufacturing."' 6 Nebraska also defines state of the art evidence in terms
of feasibilty by providing that it is "the best technology reasonably
available" at the time of sale. 17 By offering manufacturers who comply
with the state of the art standards an affirmative defense in product
actions, these statutes encourage manufacturers to keep abreast of scien-
tific and technological advances and develop their product's safety tech-
nology to the point that it is economically feasible.
Statutes in Indiana 8 and Iowa 9 also provide affirmative defenses to
product liability defendants proving conformity with state of the art.
These statutes, however, provide that evidence of conformity with this
standard is measured at the time the product was "designed, manufac-
tured, packaged or labelled." 20 By measuring the manufacturer's respon-
sibility to provide defect-free products from the time of its first design,
these states impose a more stringent requirement upon a defendant seeking
to introduce state of the art evidence, especially if it manufactures and
markets a product with long design lead times.
The Colorado product liability statute creates a rebuttable presump-
tion that a product was neither defective nor its manufacturer or seller
negligent if, before the sale, it conformed to the "state of the art as
distinguished from industrial standards." ' 2' By distinguishing state of the
art from general industrial standards, this statute immunizes manufacturers
who incorporate new advancements in safety devises and scientific tech-
niques and expressly withholds such protection to those who merely follow
the customs of the industry.
The Kentucky Product Liability Act, 22 on'the other hand, creates a
rebuttable presumption that a product is not defective if its design,
15. ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-683 (1984); NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-21, 182 (1985).
16. AiRz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-683 (1984).
17. NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-21, 182 (1985).
18. IND. CODE ANN. § 33-1-1.5-4(4) (Burns 1983). The affirmative defense afforded by this statute
is limited to actions in which "physical harm is caused by a defective product." Id. § 33-1-1.5-
4(4) (Burns 1983).
19. IOWA CODE ANN. § 668.12 (Supp. 1986). This statute provides that "a percentage of fault shall
not be assigned to the [the defendants] if they plead and prove that the product conformed to
the state of the art ...." Id. at § 668.12 (Supp. 1986).
20. IND. CODE ANN. § 33-1-1.5-4(4) (Burns 1983); IOWA CODE ANN. § 668.12 (Supp. 1986). See
also, KY. REV. STAT. § 411.310 (2) (1986).
21. COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-403(1)(a) (Supp. 1987).
22. Ky. REV. STAT. § 411.310 (2) (1986).
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manufacturing, or testing standards conform either to the state of the art
or "generally recognized and prevailing standards" in the industry.23 The
Kentucky law thus provides a more liberal requirement for protection and
raises a presumption in the defendant's favor so long as its production
practices are accepted by the industry. 24
Several states, including Utah, Tennessee and Kansas, have enacted
provisions in their product liability statutes that create a presumption of
a product's nondefectiveness if it complies with government standards
established for the industry.25 Although it has been recommended that
such standards be objective, rigorous and up to date, 26 they may, in fact,
be no more than minimum standards developed by the industry. Conse-
quently, these standards may function as protection to industries that are
customarily slow to seek safety advances or are satisfied with a low level
of safety.
Kansas and Washington have almost identical provisions, and each
provides an absolute defense to a manufacturer whose products are in
compliance with mandatory government contract specifications relating to
design, manufacturing and warning. 27 Conversely, noncompliance with
such specifications will deem the product defective. 2  This protection
assumes that the specifications will consistently provide adequate guidelines
for producing defect-free products.
Not all product liability statutes addressing the issue of state of the
art standards provide defendants with a defense in product liability actions.
State of the art provisions in Arkansas and Washington are designed
exclusively for the purpose of designating admissible evidence.29 In Ar-
kansas, a defendant may introduce evidence of compliance with govern-
ment statutes or administrative regulations, but only to show that a
product is not unreasonably dangerous.30 The Washington product liability
provision is not so restrictive. It states that not only compliance with
regulatory standards, but also evidence of custom in the industry and
technological feasibility may be introduced for the trier of facts to
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. UTAH CODE ANi. § 78-15-6(3) (Supp. 1986); TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-28-104 (1983); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 60-3304(a)(b) (1983). Under the Kansas statute, the presumption of nondefectiveness
may be rebutted if the claimant "proves by a preponderance of evidence that a reasonable
prudent product seller could and would have taken additional steps." KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-
3304(a) (1983). The statutes in Utah and Tennessee do not explicitly prescribe a basis for
rebutting the statutory presumption of nondefectiveness.
26. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, FnAL REPORT OF THE INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE ON PRODUCT
LIABmITY, at vii-40 (1978).
27. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3304(c) (1983); WASH. REV. CODE § 7.72.050 (2) (Supp.1987).
28. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3304(d) (1983); WASH. REV. CODE § 7.72.050 (2) (Supp. 1987).
29. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 34-2804 (1983); WASH. REV. CODE § 7.72.050 (1) (Supp. 1987).
30. The Arkansas Code provides that state of the art evidence "shall be considered as evidence that
the product is not in an unreasonably dangerous condition in regard to matters covered by these
standards." ARK. STAT. ANN. § 34-2804 (1983),
[Vol. 14:261
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consider .3 Thus, these statutes provide guidelines for the admission of
evidence of compliance with state of art and government standards without
permitting such evidence to be dispositive in the determination of liability.
CONCLUSION
The recent flurry of state activity dealing with the procedure for
admission of state of the art evidence and the weight to be given such
evidence suggests that the doctrine has a secure future in the area of
product liability litigation. The admissibility of such evidence has increas-
ingly been seen as a means by which courts can protect manufacturers
from unjust claims. It is highly probable that states will continue exper-
imenting with the doctrine in an attempt to make product liability litigation
fairer for both parties.
Donald E. Stuby*
31. In Arkansas:
Evidence of custom in the product seller's industry, technological feasibility, or that the
product was or was not in compliance with nongovernment standards or with legislative
regulatory standards or with administrative regulatory standards, whether relating to
design, construction or performance of the product or to warn or instruct as to its use
may be considered by the trier of fact.
ARK. STAT. ANN. § 7.72.050(l) (1983).
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